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COMMENTS
REAL ESTATE SYNDICATION
Real property is and always has been an important aspect of our in-
dustrial society. It is an important source of investment and is itself a sound
investment. In the case of the average investor, however, realty can be
purchased only on a small scale. Moreover, to the inexperienced, real estate
may bring more burdens than rewards. Thus, problems of management,
maintenance, taxation, and possible liability often induce an individual to
turn to securities investment. In addition, real estate transactions usually
require large sums of money and financing, leaving the good opportunities
primarily to the "giants." But even the "giants" had difficulty raising the
required cash and financing and concentrating it into one piece of property.
Thus "it became clear that investment in important structures could not
be a lone hand venture. . . . [In addition,] the big fellow was worrying about
how to prevent the tax problem from reducing him to a little fellow . . .
[and the little fellow] was aching to get into a real estate venture . . . [so]
he 'could make enough money to worry about the tax problem in the first
place'.'
From these dynamic tensions the real estate syndicate was formed, designed
to make the "little fellow" a "big fellow" and to keep the latter from be-
coming the former.
I. NATURE OF THE SYNDICATE
A. Generally
A syndicate has been described as "the pooling of the resources of a group
of individual investors to acquire or develop an agreed-upon real asset." 2
This definition obscures the true nature of the syndicate. Ordinarily, rather
than individuals pooling together and buying, a contract is first made by
one or more promoters who in turn make a public offering3 of participating
shares in much the same manner as a securities issue is sold to the public.
These shares may be offered on one particular building, or in a lot consisting
of more than one,4 or it may be in a lease5 rather than a building; in fact
1. Hershman, The Why and the How of Real Estate Syndications, 14 Record of
N.Y.C.B.A. 45, 46 (1959).
2. Berger, Real Estate Syndication: Property, Promotion, and the Need for Protection,
69 Yale L.J. 725, 726-27 (1960).
3. E.g., Navarre-500 Bldg. Associates Prospectus (May 2, 1958). A contract was made
for the purchase of the building by the associates, which at the time consisted of only two
partners, and then offered to the public in participating shares. Id. at 3. A syndicate can
be more realistically described as "a large group, who share the ownership of a position
in real estate, and set up a procedure which enables them to hold this investment, planned
as a permanent investment." Wien, How the Syndicate Functions, 14 Record of N.Y.C.B.A.
51, 52 (1959).
4. E.g., Center-City Properties Prospectus (Jan. 19, 1962). This was a syndication
of three separate properties, to be owned in fee by one syndicate.
5. E.g., Empire State Bldg. Associates Prospectus (Oct. 31, 1961). The syndicate upon
completion of transactions was to own a net lease, with renewal privileges, which would
run for approximately 114 years. Id. at 3.
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they may be offered in any form in which real estate may exist. 6 At the same
time the syndicate itself may exist as a trust,7 corporation,8 partnership,"
limited partnership,' or as a tenancy in common."
B. Creation of the Syndicate
1. Role of the Promoter
Syndication begins with a syndicate manager or promoter who creates the
investment.Y2 It is his job to select property suitable for investment; in this
task he is usually assisted by expert consultants. He then determines income
and financing details. At the same time a lessee must be found, or, if it
is a lease that will be purchased, a sublessee. If neither can be found one
must be created,' 3 for the lessee will ultimately undertake the actual operation
of the property. Pre-contract provision is also made, whereby the prospective
lessee is bound to acquire an actual equity in the real estate." Soon there-
after a contract is made to purchase the property and a cash deposit is given
which is usually forfeited in the event title does not close.0 A syndicate is
then formed which will purchase the property'0 or purchase the promoter's
right to buy the property. 7 Finally a public offering of the participating
shares is made.' s
6. E.g., 120 Broadvay Associates Prospectus (April 12, 1956) (office building); Center-
City Properties Prospectus (Jan. 19, 1962) (apartment building); Plaza Hotel Azociatcs
Prospectus (Mlarch 13, 1959) (hotel); Glickman Corp., Real Estate Syndication Circular,
p. 6 (industrial center).
7. See Wien, How the Syndicate Functions, 14 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 51, 52 (1959).
S. E.g., La Guardia East Prospectus (June 21, 1961).
9. E.g., Empire State Bldg. Associates Prospectus (Oct. 31, 1961).
10. E.g., 63 Wall St. Associates Prospectus (Sept. 6, 1961).
11. See Sire Plan Portfolios, Inc. v. Carpentier, 3 Ill. App. 2d 354, 132 N.E.2d 73 (1956).
12. Wien, How the Syndicate Functions, 14 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 51, 55 (1959).
13. Id. at 53. The lessee will operate the property; he is of prime impartance to
avoid having the syndicate labeled as an association. That is why, if a lezzce cannot h
found, he must be created.
14. Id. at 53-54.
15. Id. at 54.
16. The actual formation of the syndicate does not have to occur at this point, but
it is usually formed after the property is selected, because the syndicate is formed for the
sole purpose of acquiring a specific piece of property. E.g., in one syndicate organized
as a limited partnership it was stated that the purpose was to acquire "complcte fee
ownership of the 35-story office building kmown as 63 Wall Street.... 1 63 Wall St. As-
sociates Prospectus, p. 3 (Sept. 6, 1961).
17. See Garment Capitol Associates Prospectus, p. 6 (Feb. 13, 1957).
is. The offering to the public is a timely matter because it might have to be registered
first under the Securities Act of 1933, 4S Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (195s)
(Supp. II, 1959-1960); and under the New York Real Estate Syndicate Act, N.Y. Gen.
Bus. Law §§ 352e-52j.
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2. Remuneration of the Promoter
The promoter may realize remuneration in various forms. As initiator of
the transaction he may deduct a profit "off the top."' 9 If he chooses, he may
assign his interest in the contract to the syndicate2" or, if he is the owner,
sell his interest in the property to the syndicate.2 1 At the same time he can
also be the lessee or sublessee and thereby receive an income from operating
the property.22 Underwriting may be done by a corporation owned by the
promoter and a fee may thus be earned. 23 Further, if circumstances permit,
his company may receive a broker's commission for selling the property24
or may be retained to perform supervisory management services.25 If the
organizer is a lawyer, he or his firm may receive a fee for performing the
legal services involved in the transaction, and additional provision may be
made whereby he is hired by the syndicate on an annual retainer.2 0 Whichever
vehicle is chosen, the promoter will almost certainly expend considerable
amounts of his own money for expenses, surveys, consultation, prospectuses,
and down payments, all of which he stands to forfeit if title does not close.2
Thus, the promoter takes the original risks of syndication; once formed,
however, the risks rest mainly on the participants.
2 8
3. Pros and Cons of Participation
Individual investors, indispensable as they are, have no choice as to what
form the syndicate will assume. Their sole decision is: should they invest?
The syndicate usually offers a high return,29 but unlike securities there is
19. See, e.g., Empire State Bldg. Associates Prospectus, p. 3 (Oct. 31, 1961).
20. E.g., The Beaver & William St. Co. Prospectus, p. 3 (Oct. 27, 1961).
21. E.g., Navarre-500 Bldg. Associates Prospectus, p. 3 (May 2, 1958).
22. E.g., Garment Capitol Associates, where the property was simultaneously leased
to another partnership, in which the general partners in the syndicate were also partners.
Garment Capitol Associates Prospectus, p. 3 (Feb. 13, 1957).
23. E.g., The Beaver & William St. Co. Prospectus, p. 3 (Oct. 27, 1961).
24. See Empire State Bldg. Associates Prospectus, p. 5 (Oct. 31, 1961).
25. See 63 Wall St. Associates Prospectus, p. 16. (Sept. 6, 1961).
26. See Empire State Bldg. Associates Prospectus, p. 5 (Oct. 31, 1961).
27. Wien, How the Syndicate Functions, 14 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 51, 54 (1959).
28. After the participating shares are marketed the organizer is usually reimbursed for
his expenses, and thus no longer has a risk. See The Beaver & William St. Co. Prospectus,
p. 5 (Oct. 27, 1961). But where the participant is a member of a joint venture he will
have unlimited liability. E.g., Empire State Building Associates, where each general partner
executed a joint venture agreement, to the extent of his interest, with the parti-
cipants. Thus any member can be liable, under the laws of New York, for the full amount
of any obligation of the associates. See Empire State Bldg. Associates Prospectus, p. 12
(Oct. 31, 1961).
29. The anticipated distributions are usually around 10% per annum. See, e.g., Tie
Beaver & William St. Co. Prospectus (Oct. 27, 1961) ; Center-City Properties Prospectus
(Jan. 19, 1962).
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relatively small participation at relatively high prices r3  For the most part
the investor will enjoy limited liability.31 He will not share in management and
except for major decisions will have no say at all.32 On the other hand, the
investor will usually have a tax shelter resulting from depreciation de-
ductions2 3 thereby increasing his effective rate of return while his annual
income and his interest in the syndicate will remain constant3 4 His investment
attracts, at best, a slim market 35 and usually is not freely transferable;cG
but relative safety is afforded by federal,37 state,23 and private association9
regulations designed to protect the investor and increase public confidence
in syndicates 40
30. The following schedule will illustrate the number of units and price:
No. of Units Price
Available Per Unit
1. Garment Capitol Associates 1047 $I0'ua
2. Beaver & William St. Co. 220 5'C:0
3. Plaza Hotel Associates 63S 10, 2o
4. 120 Broadway Associates 1045 1O0
S. Empire State Bldg. Associates 3900 10,0:0
* May be sold in Y unit participations.
There is, however, one group especially designed for small investors. The Sire Plan
(Small Investors Real Estate Plan, Inc.), which was formed in New York, markets to the
small investor. Cost per unit usually ranges from $1C0 to $1,00D. See La Guardia East
Prospectus, p. 2 (June 21, 1961). See also Sire Plan Performance Record (Aug. 1, 1961).
31. Some syndicates do not offer the limited liability feature. See, e., Empire State
Bldg. Associates Prospectus (Oct. 31, 1961).
32. Because the lessee is in charge of the operation of the property, it is his rezpondbility
to manage it. In addition, participating agreements usually delegate power to the general
partners to make other decisions not being made by the le-sce. But the partner will usually
not have the power to sell, mortgage, or renew leases without the consent of the participants.
Id. at 12.
33. Depreciation will reduce the taxable income. In the case of a partncrohip, the
partner's basis will be reduced by the amount of money distributed to such partner. Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 733(1). In the case of a stockholder, a distribution in excez3 of earn-
ings and profits is deemed a return of capital. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 301(c) (2)-(c) (3).
34. Each year as he reduces his basis by the amount of tax free income, his investment
will grow smaller, thus his rate of return will increase.
35. There is usually a restriction on free transferability of participating intcrcts. ThL
would hamper any marketing operations. See, e.g., 63 Wall St. AEsociates Prospectus, p. 3
(Sept. 6, 1961).
36. Ibid.
37. Securities Act of 1933, 43 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1953) (Supp.
II, 1959-1960).
3S. The Real Estate Syndicate Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352e-52j.
39. In New York, the Association of Real Estate Syndicators, Inc. police3 the actions
of its members.
40. Securities Act of 1933, 4S Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1953) (Supp.
II, 1959-1960), and the New York act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352e-52j, are basically full-
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II. MECHANICS OF THE SYNDICATE
A. Form and Purpose
Tax considerations generally suggest the operational form which the
syndicate will assume.41 At the present time partnerships and limited partner-
ships are most popular.42 Formation usually is for the sole purpose of ac-
quiring title to a specific property or lease. In one such syndicate it was
stated that the group was formed for the "sole purpose of acquiring the
Master Lease on the Empire State Building, to receive the rent under the
Sublease. . . . It does not propose to engage in any other activities .... '"1
This particular syndicate was formed with three general partners, each owning
a one-third interest. Provision was made for each partner to enter into
participation agreements with investors respecting that particular partner's
interest in the syndicate. Each agreement, therefore, created a joint venture,
and in this case three ventures were formed. It was further provided that
the partner would be the agent for the participants in his partnership in-
terest, with the power to bind his participants.44
Syndicates using the limited partnership form generally use a method
different from the general partnership in marketing participation. 4 It should
be noted that under New York law, participants in this form of syndication
occupy the status of limited partners. 40
B. Choice of Property
Many factors play in the selection of property for a syndicate basis. To
be suitable for syndication, the property should show a return of twelve per cent
or more on equity. In most cases, however, this value has to be created.
47
Competition, too, is a key factor in the selection of property and an analysis
of this is usually accomplished by experts in the field.
48
disclosure acts. But New York's Martin Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352-59b, is basically
an anti-fraud act. See Kroll, Syndication and Regulation, 14 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 71, 79
(1959). While the Association of Real Estate Syndicators is a private organization, It Is
designed to increase public confidence in the syndicate.
41. See generally Spandorf, Real Estate Syndicates: How to Organize, Operate and
Sell Them for Tax Advantage, 6 J. Taxation 44 (1957).
42. This is true because these firms can avoid the corporate tax and thus offer a greater
return on investment. But the Real Estate Investment Trust Act, Int. Rev. 'Code of 1954,
§§ 856-58, may help to popularize the trust form.
43. Empire State Bldg. Associates Prospectus, p. 11 (Oct. 31, 1961).
44. Id. at 12-13.
45. E.g., 63 Wall St. Associates Prospectus (Sept. 6, 1961) (units sold as limited partner-
ship interests).
46. N.Y. Partnership Law §§ 90-119.
47. E.g., the property might only show an 8% return and through refinancing have a
yield of 12%. See Helmsley, Business Aspects, 14 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 48, 50 (1959).
48. Wien, How the Syndicate Functions, 14 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 51, 53 (1959).
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C. Acquisition of the Propcrty
1. Methods
Purchase of the prop6rty, more often than not, involves a series of com-
plicated and simultaneous transactions. The property may be purchased
directly from the owner with a simultaneous leaseback.A In one acquisition
the property was purchased from the original owner by the syndicate, then
sold to a third party who leased it back to the syndicate which in turn simul-
taneously subleased it to another. The sublessee was in the form of a joint
venture in which one of the members was also a general partner in the syndi-
cate.50 In another case, the property was purchased from the original owner by
a corporation, which then sold it to a syndicate and the latter simultaneously
leased it back to the corporation. The principal officer of the corporation was
a general partner in the syndicate. Involved in the transaction was a third
corporation which was retained in a supervisory capacity at an annual fee.
Here too the principal officer was a general partner in the syndicate. 1 In
yet another acquisition a lease was purchased from a partnership and im-
mediately subleased to another partnership. One of the principal partners
in the syndicate was at the same time a partner in each of the other groups
involved. 5 2  2. Reasons for Complexity
The immediate leaseback, or sublease as the case may be, is of prime im-
portance to divorce management of the property from the syndicate. 3 In some
situations it may be leased back to the seller, in which case the latter might
enjoy an immediate capital gain and still retain possession0 4 In addition, con-
version frees cash for further investment. 5 The leaseback arrangement also
carries several advantages for the syndicate-operation of the property by a
third party, annual payments upon which to base distributions,50 and several
possible tax benefits.57
49. E.g., 120 Broadway Associates Prospectus, p. 3 (April 12, 1956); Plaza Hotel
Associate Prospectus% p. 3 (Sept. 6, 1961).
50. Empire State Bldg. Associates Prospectus, p. 3 (Oct. 31, 1961).
51. 63 Wall St. Associates Prospectus, p. 6 (Sept. 6, 1961).
52. Navarre-500 Bldg. Associates Prospectus, pp. 3-4 (May 2, 195S).
53. It is important to separate ownership and management to prevent the or-anization
from being taxed as an association. See generally White, How to Prevent Real Es.ate
Venture Being Taxed as a Corporation, 12 J. Taxation 4S (1960).
54. E.g., the property may have been fully depredatcd and have a zero bastE, so it might
be advantageous to convert it into cash. See generally Mandell, Tax Aspects of Sales and
Leasebacks as Practical Devices for Transfer and Operation of Real Property, N.Y.U. Isth
Inst. on Fed. Tax 17 (1960).
55. Id. at IS.
56. Mcst leases provide for an annual payment to the syndicate on v hich the 'yndicate
bases its anticipated distributions. In most cases the lessee will guarantee payment but
this guarantee usually will not extend beyond the rent collected by the lezsce. E.g., in one
acquisition a corporation capitalized at $2,5C0 was to pay a minimum rLnt of F275,Cta
annually. So, in effect, the payment of rent depends on the Iczes profits from operation
under the lease. La Guardia East Prospectus, pp. 16-17 (June 21, 1961).
57. See Smith, Associations Classified as Corporations Under the Internal Revenue Ccde,
34 Calif. L. Rev. 461 (1946).
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D. Status, Liability, and Rights of Participant
As the syndicate may assume a corporate, limited partnership, or general
partnership form, so the participant will be a stockholder, 5 limited partner,50
or joint venturer. 60 His liability will also vary according to the form of the
syndicate: in the corporate, limited partnership, and trust forms he will
enjoy limited liability. 1 As a joint venturer his liability is unlimited. 2 Rights
and duties are defined by agreement 63 and generally both are restricted.0 4 His
income, too, will vary according to the form of the syndicate. Generally, the
partnership forms offer a higher return because they avoid the double taxation
feature of the corporate form.65
III. TAX CONSIDERATIONS
A. Generally
The prime factor that led to the formation and form of the syndicate was
taxation.6 From a tax point of view the corporate form is least desirable.07
The selection, however, of the more popular partnership forms does not of
itself resolve the tax problems, for, despite nomenclature, there is always
the danger of corporate tax treatment. This danger results from the broad
definition assigned to a corporation under the Internal Revenue Code of
1954,08 which specifically includes associations.6 9 Thus, careful draftsmanship
must be employed in forming the syndicate so as to avoid its classification
as an association and taxation as a corporation.
58. See, e.g., La Guardia East Prospectus (June 21, 1961).
59. See, e.g., 63 Wall St. Associates Prospectus (Sept. 6, 1961).
60. See, e.g., Empire State Bldg. Associates Prospectus (Oct. 31, 1961).
61. N.Y. Partnership Law § 96.
62. See Brown v. Bedell, 263 N.Y. 177, 188 N.E. 641 (1934).
63. In order to purchase participating shares, the participant will enter into a written
agreement which will enumerate his rights under the syndicate. See, e.g., Empire State Bldg.
Associates Prospectus, pp. 12-13 (Oct. 31, 1961).
64. See, e.g., ibid. (participating agreements); 63 Wall St. Associates Prospectus, p. 15
(Sept. 6, 1961) (partnership agreement); Navarre-500 Bldg. Associates Prospectus, pp.
10-11 (May 2, 1958).
65. Under the corporate form, the corporation pays a tax as an entity; then the partici-
pants pay another tax as they receive the income. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 11. Under
a partnership form, the partnership itself does not pay any tax, all income being taxed to
the partners. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 701.
66. Hershman, The Why and the How of Real Estate Syndications, 14 Record of
N.Y.C.BA. 45, 46 (1959). The scope of this paper does not include syndication of non-
income producing property; in that instance tax planning might be different. See Spandorf,
Real Estate Syndicates: How to Organize, Operate and Sell Them for Tax Advantage, 6 J.
Taxation 44 (1957).
67. It has, however, been used. See, e.g., La Guardia East Prospectus (June 21, 1961).
68. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701(3).
69. Ibid.
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B. Treasury Regulations
In 1960 the Treasury issued regulations defining its position regarding
classification of organizations for corporate tax treatment:Y It states that an
"organization will be treated as an association if the corporate characteristics
are such that the organization more nearly resembles a corporation than a
partnership or trust."7 1 The characteristics listed to aid this determination are:
(1) associates; (2) an objective to carry on a business and divide the gains
therefrom; (3) continuity of life; (4) centralization of management; (5)
liability for corporate debts limited to the corporate property; and, (6)
free transferability of interest.72 As to which of these tests will governm, the
regulations go on to say that when "the organization has more corporate
characteristics than noncorporate characteristics" it will be classified as an
association.73 In applying this test, however, those characteristics common
to both will not be considered. Thus, if a limited partnership has centralized
management and free transferability but lacks continuity of life and limited
liability, it will not be classified as an association even though it has as-
sociates and an objective to carry on a business, the latter characteristics
being common to both forms of enterpriseY4
C. Specific Characteristics To Be Avoided
1. Continuity of Life
"An organization has continuity of life if the death, insanity, bankruptcy,
retirement, resignation or expulsion of any member will not cause a dis-
solution of the organization.173 Dissolution does not mean the organization
must terminate, but only that there is an alteration in its idcntity. '- Thus, an
agreement may provide for the continued existence of an organization without
70. Treas. Reg, §§ 301.7701-1 to .7701-7 (1960); r.s Rustigan, Effect of Regulation
Definitions on Real Estate Syndicates, N.Y.U. 19th Inst. on Fed. Tax 105S (1951). See
also Driscoll, The Association Problem in Joint Ventures and Limited Partnemhip:, N.Y.U.
17th Inst. on Fed. Tax 1067 (1959); Heard, How to Avoid the Taxation of Limited
Partnerships as Corporations, 6 J. Taxation 293 (1957).
71. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (a) (1) (1960).
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid. These characteristics of a corporation given by the Treasury are barzd on the
rules set out in Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935). It was stated by the
Court: "'Association' implies associates. It implies the entering into a joint enterpris...
an enterprise for the transaction of business." Id. at 356. The Court went on to say that
"the inclusion of associations with corporations implies resemblance." Id. at 357. The features
of a corporation could be listed as: (1) title in the entity; (2) centralization of management;
(3) continuity of life; (4) limitation of liability; (5) free transferability of interest. Id. at
359. The first criterion, i.e., title in the entity, has been disregarded as a factor by the
Treasury, since under the Uniform Partnership Act § 3(3), a partnership can hold real
estate in the partnership name.
74. This is the example given by the regulations. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (3) (190).
75. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1960).
76. Ibid.
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creating a coptinuity of lifeYt In effect, if an organization has continuity of
identity, it has retained an association characteristic, but continuity of busi-
ness is not of itself such a characteristic. Moreover, if an organization is
subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Partnership Act or the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act it will lack continuity of life, notwith-
standing that the partnership agreement provides that no member has the
power to dissolve the organization for a stated period.78 Thus, it appears
that local law and not the agreement governs in this situation. Accordingly,
if a syndicate is organized under New York partnership laws it would lack
continuity of life.79
2. Centralized Management
"An organization has centralized management if any person . . . or group
• . . has continuing exclusive authority to make the management decisions nec-
essary to the conduct of the business for which the organization was formed." 80
This definition contemplates the concentration of power in the hands of a
small group of persons who may or may not be members of the organization.81
An organization subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Partnership
Act is not within the definition. This is so because such an organization
cannot achieve centralization of management; one partner can bind the
organization notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary among the part-
ners. 2 Likewise, a limited partnership subject to a statute corresponding to
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, will not have centralized management
unless substantially all interest is owned by the limited partners.8 3
A syndicate would appear to have centralization of management in this
respect: that a small group will make decisions necessary to the conduct of the
business for which the organization is formed, namely, to purchase property 8'
or a lease85 and to collect the rents.8 6 Although the regulations exclude certain
77. Ibid. The regulations cite Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942). This case
dealt with a limited partnership organized under the laws of New York. By law,
the partnership would dissolve upon the retirement, death, or insanity of a general partner,
unless the business is continued by the remaining general partners, (a) under a right to
do so stated in the certificate, or (b) with the consent of all members. N.Y. Partnership Law
§ 109. The partners in this case provided that in the event of death, retirement or insanity
of a general partner "the remaining partner or partners shall have the right to continue
the business." 46 B.T.A. at 184. The court spoke of this as being a "contingent continuity"
and thus it would not be analogous to the chartered life of a corporation which continues
regardless of the death or resignation of its directors or stockholders. Id. at 185.
78. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (1960).
79. The N.Y. Partnership Law is an adoption of the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act and the Uniform Partnership Act. See N.Y. Partnership Law § 1 and note following
that section.
80. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1) (1960).
81. Ibid.
82. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (4) (1960).
83. Ibid.
84. See, e.g., 63 Wall St. Associates Prospectus, p. 3 (Sept. 6, 1961).
85. See, e.g., Empire State Bldg. Associates Prospectus, p. 11 (Oct. 31, 1961).
86. Ibid. The duties of the general partners, however, would probably be considered
[Vol. 30
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partnerships,87 the methods employed by a syndicate do not seem to come
within the exclusion since some syndicates form joint ventures for each interest
owned by a general partner. The partners then, act as agents for the partici-
pants and have the power to make decisions for the group 53 Those syndicates
operating under the form of the limited partnership are not within the ex-
clusion because substantially all of the interests are owned by the limited
partners.ra It must be noted however, that the regulations require that the
management group make decisions necessary to the "conduct of the busi-
ness. '9 It might be argued that the lessee and not the syndicate is conducting
the business91 and the only function of management is to perform ministerial
acts.92
The syndicate employs the method of simultaneous acquisition and leasingP3
to divorce management of the property from ownership. Thus, the syndicate
as owner will achieve some measure of control, yet avoid the characterization
of centralized management since the lessee, managing the property at a
profit,9 4 will merely pay a net rent to the lessor. While the regulations indi-
cate that the management group may or may not be a member of the
organization,95 it would seem they contemplate professional management
retained by and representing the organization. The lessee, however, is not
acting for the organization, but rather in his ovm behalf. This view seems
to be in conformity with Morrissey v. Commissioncr.20
ministerial and thus not centralized management. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(3) (1960).
87. E.g., those organized under statutes corresponding to the Uniform Partner-hip Act.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (4) (1960).
88. See, e.g, Empire State Bldg. Associates Prospectus, p. 12 (Oct. 31, 1961).
89. E.g., The Beaver and Williams Street Company was capitalized at $1,1C,C) of
which $9C0,000 was to be contributed by limited partners. See Beaver & Williams St. Co.
Prospectus, p. 4 (Oct. 27, 1961). See also Center-City Properties Prcspactus, pp. 4-5 (Jan.
19, 1962) (capitalized at $40,0O of which $390,000 was to be contributed by limited
partners).
90. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1) (1960).
91. See Lansdowne Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d 56 (lst Cir. 1931); Sears v.
Hassett, 45 F. Supp. 772 (D. Mlass. 1942).
92. "[T]here is not centralized management when the centralized authority is merely to
perform ministerial acts as an agent at the direction of a principal" TriLs. Reg, §
301.7701-2(c) (3) (1960).
93. See, e.g., 63 Wall St. Associates Prospectus, p. 6 (Sept. 6, 1961). See ako Empire
State Bldg. Associates Prospectus, p. 3 (Oct. 31, 1961) (sublease).
94. Ibid.
95. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2) (1960).
96. 296 U.S. 344 (1935). In the Morrissey decision it was stated that "corporate organiza-
tion furnishes the opportunity for a centralized management through repreentatives of the
members of the corporation." Id. at 359. This concept of centralized management through
representatives was again emphasized in Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Azociates, 296 U.S.
369, 373 (1935). Then in Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942), which involved
a limited partnership, it was stated: "There was centralized control by the general
partners... [but] they were acting in their own interest ... and not merely in a
representative capacity... ." Id. at 185. See also Smith, Associations Classified as Corpora-
tions Under the Internal Revenue Code, 34 Calif. L. Rev. 461, 513-14 (1946). In applying
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Indirectly, the syndicate does achieve the benefits of centralized manage-
ment. It can do this because the lessee or sublessee may be a corporation
wholly owned by one of the general partners,0 7 or it may. be a partnership
whose general partner is also a general partner in the syndicate.08 In many
cases the lessee is a creation of the syndicate 9 solely for this purpose. It
is highly undesirable that the lessee be a total stranger since it might exploit
the investment, and damage the interest of the participants. 10 0 In such a
situation, the reputation of the promoter and his ability to raise funds in
the future would also be impaired.
3. Limited Liability
"An organization has the corporate characteristic of limited liability if
under local law there is no member who is personally liable for the debts of or
claims against the organization."'' 1 Syndicates organized under state statutes
corresponding to the Uniform Partnership Act would not have limited liability
because the general partners are held to be personally liable.10 2 This, however,
does not automatically insure that a limited partnership subject to such a
statute would possess the characteristic of non-limited liability. The courts
will search beyond the structure itself to question whether a general partner
has substantial assets which can be reached. It must appear that the general
partner is not a mere "dummy" acting as agent for the limited partners;103
if such agency exists there is in effect limited liability. The usual method of
avoiding this difficulty is to place an individual with substantial assets as a
partner in the organization. 04 Although complying with the regulations,
limited liability may in fact be achieved by the use of an exoneration clause, 10
whereby the mortgagee agrees not to look beyond the property for payment.
Where a lease is purchased, a similar result is obtained when the lessor agrees
not to impose any liability on the lessee beyond the actual occupancy of
the property.'0 6
the rules of these cases to the syndicates it would seem that the lessee would not be
acting in a representative capacity but in his own interest. The regulations, however,
eliminate "in a representative capacity" from its definition of centralized management.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1960). Thus it has been said that the regulations represent
a considerable change in prior law. See Aronsohn, Syndicates, N.Y.U. 18th Inst. on Fed. Tax
63, 81 (1960).
97. See, e.g., 63 Wall St. Associates Prospectus, p. 4 (Sept. 6, 1961).
98. See, e.g., Navarre-500 Bldg. Associates Prospectus, p. 4 (May 2, 1958).
99. See Wien, How the Syndicate Functions, 14 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 51, 53 (1959).
100. Id. at 53-54.
101. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (1960).
102. Ibid.
103. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2) (1960).
104. See, e.g., Empire State Bldg. Associates Prospectus, p. 11 (Oct. 31, 1961); 63
Wall St. Associates Prospectus, p. 16 (Sept. 6, 1961).
105. See Janin, Tax Aspects of Real Estate Syndication, 14 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 60,
63 (1959).
106. Ibid.
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4. Free Transferability of Interest
"An organizatign has the corporate characteristic of free transferability
of interests if each of its members or those members owning substantially all
of the interests in the organization have the power, without the consent of
other members, to substitute for themselves in the same organization a
person who is not a member of the organization." 07 The sale and purchase
of corporate stock is a typical example of free transferability of interest.
Such transferability would not be present in the typical syndicate because
a contract provision generally restricts alienation of participating interests. 10 3
Another classification called a "modified form" of transferability exists when
a member must first offer his interest to other members at its fair market
value. 39 Most syndicates, however, avoid this modification and require
consent of the general partners as a condition to any transfer.110 As a standard
for determining the existence of this corporate characteristic the presence
of transferability in a "modified form" will be accorded less significance than
unrestricted transferability.1 '
5. Summary of Characteristics
The ratio of corporate to noncorporate characteristics will determine the
taxable status of the syndicate."- The regulations indicate what are con-
sidered corporate characteristics and since no further explanation is offered, 119
it would seem that noncorporate characteristics arise in the absence of
corporate ones.
Of the six characteristics listed, two-the presence of associates and an
intention to carry on business for profit-are common and necessary to both
corporate and partnership forms of enterprise." 4 Thus, the absence of either
of these two elements will preclude a syndicate from being an association.1"0
On this premise it may be argued that a syndicate holding a lease or sublease is
not doing business because it exists merely to collect rents.110 Accordingly,
where a syndicate uses the trust form to hold a lease it has been held that the
trust should not be classed as an association." 7 Of course, the presence of these
107. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1960).
10S. See, e.g., 63 Wall St. Associates Prospectus, p. 15 (Sept. 6, 1961). But the Empire
State Bldg. Associates, had no restriction on transferability. See Empire State Bldg.
Associates Prospectus, p. 13 (Oct. 31, 1961).
109. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (2) (1960).
110. See, e.g., 63 Wall St. Associates Prospectus, p. 15 (Sept. 6, 1961) ; Center-City
Properties Prospectus, p. 16 (Jan. 19, 1962). But see Empire State Bldg. As-ociatcs Pros-
pectus, p. 13 (Oct. 31, 1961).
ii1. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(2) (1960).
112. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960).
113. Ibid.
114. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1960).
115. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1960).
116. See, e.g., 63 Wall St. Associates Prospectus, p. 3 (Sept. 6, 1961); Empire State
Bldg. Associates Prospectus, p. 11 (Oct. 31, 1961).
117. Lansdowne Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d 56 (Ist Cir. 1931); Sears. v.
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two elements will not be weighed against the syndicate in determining its tax
status.
Assuming an organization possesses two of the remaining four character-
istics, the examples given in the regulations indicate that a syndicate runs
little risk of being classified as an association. 118 It is of significance to note
that an organization will lack both continuity of life and limited liability
when organized under statutes corresponding to the Uniform Partnership
Act. 1 9 A limited partnership will also lack these characteristics when its
general partners have substantial assets and it is subject to the provisions of
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.' 20
D. Tax Aspects to Participant
In choosing a syndicate in which to invest, the individual will generally be
most interested in obtaining the highest return on his investment. From prior
considerations it may appear that investment in an unincorporated syndicate
will accomplish this goal. Although this is generally the case,' 2' situations
Hassett, 45 F. Supp. 772 (D. Mass. 1942). It was stated that the trustees "were not
carrying on business after the form and manner of a corporation .... The trustees were
not called upon to seek tenants or do anything with reference to the property of any
consequence except to collect the rents." 50 F.2d at 58. The syndicates employ similar
methods so as to have the lessee and not the syndicate operate the property. See, e.g.,
Empire State Bldg. Associates Propectus, p. 11 (Oct. 31, 1961).
118. (1) A group of 25 persons form an organization for the purpose of engaging In
real estate investment activities. The organization has the characteristics of centralized
management, modified form of free transferability of interests, associates, and an object
to carry on the business and divide the gains therefrom. But the organization, lacking
continuity of life and limited liability, will be characterized as a partnership for all
purposes under the Internal Revenue Code. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g)(4) (1960).
(2) Same facts as above and the organization has associates and an objective to carry
on business and divide the gains therefrom. While the organization does not have limited
liability, it does have continuity of life, centralized management, and a modified form of
free transferability of interest. It will be classified as an association. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
2(g)(5) (1960).
(3) Same facts as above and the organization has associates and an objective to carry
on business and divide the gains therefrom. It does not have continuity of life but does have
limited liability, centralized management, and a modified form of free transferability of
interest. The organization will be classified as an association. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) (6)
(1960).
119. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(b) (3), 301.7701-2(d) (1) (1960).
120. Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-2(d)(2) (1960).
121. The following is a schedule of a comparison of the returns offered by syndicates.
Syndicate Form Rate of return
1. Sire Plan,
Hotel La Guardia* corporate 8%
2. Sire Plan,
115 Chambers Street* corporate 8%
* Taken from Sire Plan Performance Record (Aug. 1, 1961).
(Continued at bottom of next page)
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do arise where an incorporated syndicate, despite double taxation,12 will
offer an equally generous returnas as the partnership. Thus, the investor
must look to substantial factors rather than form in determining the object
of his investment.
1. Effect of Depreciation on Tax Free Income
For each taxable year, the syndicate is allowed a depreciation allowance
for wear and tear on all the property except the land. -4 Taxable income is
thereby reduced but since the deduction does not represent any actual
expenditure there is no reduction in cash available for distribution. Thus any
amount distributed in excess of the taxable income will result in a tax free
distribution to the participantYm5 This tax free distribution is deemed a
return of capital, and it must be deducted from the participant's basis 20 for
the purpose of determining the amount of taxable gain in the event that the
participation is sold. Thus, if the participant had been reducing his basis
yearly, and sold his interest at the same price he paid for it, he would
realize a taxable gain on the sale. 7
121. (Continued)
Syndicate Form Rate of Return
3. Sire Plan,
Parthenon, Bowling Alley corporate 8,
4. Empire State Bldg.
Associatest partnership 95
5. 63 Wall St.
Associates- limited partnership 10%
6. Beaver and Williams
Street Company' limited partnership 10%
i Anticipated distributions taken from prospectus.
122. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 11.
123. See, e.g., La Guardia East Prospectus (June 21, 1961) (offering 10%).
124. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(a).
125. E.g., assume that the income for the year is $100,(T0 and the allowance for
depreciation is $40,000. It will be illustrated as follows:
Taxable Income Cash Available for Distribution
Net Rent Received $100,000 Net Rent Received $1co'ca
Less: Less: -0-
Depredation Cash Distributed $10,C20
Allowance $ 40,000
Taxable Income $ 60,000
126. In the case of a partnership his basis is reduced by the amount rccavcd, Int. RCv.
Code of 1954, § 733(1). In case of a stockholder, the adjusted basis of the steck i, reduced
by the amount in excess of a dividend. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 301(c) (2).
127. Assume that the participant's basis is $1,000; that over the course of five year. he
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Several methods of depreciation are available128 but regardless of method
the total amount to be depreciated will remain the same.120 The annual
amount deducted, on the other hand, will vary according to the method of
depreciation employed.' 30 If a syndicate chooses the straight line method,
the annual deduction will remain constant throughout the period of deprecia-
tion and thus if there is no mortgage, the tax free income will also be constant
each year.131 But, if an accelerated method is used, deductions will decelerate
over the period of depreciation. 13 2
2. Effect of a Mortgage on Tax Free Income
Rarely does a syndicate purchase real property without the acquisition
being financed by a mortgage. The interest element of each payment
has received a tax free income of $400; and, that he sells his interest for $1,000, the original
bas's.
Original Basis $1,000
Less: Tax Free Income 400
Adjusted Basis $ 600.
The taxpayer, here, would realize a taxable gain of $400 on the resale.
128. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(b).
129. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(f).
130. E.g., the declining balance rate may be twice the rate of the straight line method.
See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(b)(2). See note 133 infra.
131. Assuming that the building has a value of $100,000 and has an estimated life of
twenty years, the following schedule will illustrate the deductions and the basis.
Basis Depreciation Allowance
Ist Yr. $100,000 $5,000
2d Yr. 95,000 5,000
3d Yr. 90,000 5,000
4th Yr. 85,000 5,000
5th Yr. 80,000 5,000
Assume that the organization makes an annual distribution of $100,000; $5,000 will be tax
free and $95,000 will be taxable.
132. Assume the same facts as in note 131 supra except that we use the declining
balance method, at twice the rate above, e.g., 10%.
Declining
Balance Depreciation
Basis Rate Allowance
1st Yr. $100,000 10% $10,000
2d Yr. 90,000 10% 9,000
3d Yr. 81,000 10% 8,100
4th Yr. 72,900 10% 7,290
5th Yr. 65,610 10% 6,561
Thus there was an annual distribution of $100,000. In the first year there would be u
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on this liability is a deductible item from income.133 Unlike the deduction for
depreciation, however, the amount paid out vill alho reduce the amount of
cash available for distribution1 3-1 Since the amount paid out representing
principal is not deductible, there is a drain on cash to the extent of the
principal amortized each year.13  Ordinarily the amount payable each year
will be constant, while the principal and interest allocations of that amount
will vary. Thus, in the early years the greater part of each payment will
represent interest while in the latter years of amortization the principal
element of each installment will increase.'13 Consequently the amount of
taxable income of $90,00. In the second year it would be $91,C0D and the taxable income
will vary yearly as the depreciation allowance declines.
133. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 163.
134. Assume the organization has to pay interest of $5,C0 and has an income of
$100,000. The following illustration will show the effect on the taxable income and
distribution:
Taxable Income Cash Available for Distribution
Net Rent Received $I00,0c 0 Net Rent Received $icOo'a
Less: Less:
Interest Expense $ 5,000 Interest Expense $ 5'a00
Depreciation $ 5,000 Cash Distributed $ 95,000
Allowance
Taxable Income $ 90,000
The $5,00 interest expense reduced the taxable income, and because it vas paid out to the
mortgagee, it also reduced the cash available for distribution.
135. E.g., assume the organization had $100,00D available for distribution and bad to
pay $10,000 representing principal of mortgage:
Taxable Income Cash Available for Dltribution
Net Rent Received $100,000 Net Rent Received $c,000
Less: Less:
Deduction -0- Amortization 10,Q3
Taxable Income $1C0,00 Cash Distributed S 90,0,)
The organization would then distribute $90,000 and have taxable inceme ef $1(,0D.
136. The following is an illustration of a typical amortization schcdule. A'scume the
terms of the mortgage to be:
Amount $91,5C0
Rate 5,45
Time 25 years
Monthly Payment $549
Payment number Payment to Interest Payment to Principal
1 $400.30 $14S.70
2 399.70 149.30
3 399.00 150.
(Contin~ued at botton of next tage)
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tax-free income will vary from year to year. 137 In order to extend amortization
of principal over a greater period, syndicates often finance an acquisition
with a "balloon mortgage," i.e., a mortgage, upon whose expiration there
remains a portion of principal unpaid.' 38
3. Relation of Depreciation to Amortization
While depreciation' 3" and amortization 140 oppose each other respecting
money available for distribution, interest may be termed a "neutral element,"
because, although it reduces cash available for distribution, it correspondingly
reduces taxable income. 141 Thus, the difference between depredation and
amortization determines tax-free income (if any). Practically, therefore,
where depreciation exceeds amortization the difference will result in tax-
free income,' 42 and the basis of the investment will correspondingly be re-
136. (Continued)
Payment Number Payment to Interest Payment to Principal
141 $275.00 $274.00
142 273.80 275.20
143 272.60 276.40
297 7.70 541.30
298 5.30 543.70
299 2.90 546.10
137. The amount of tax free income to the participant will be affected by the amount
of amortization of the mortgage. Thus, in the early years of the mortgage where the
amount of amortization is small, the effect will be slight, but in the later years when
amortization is high, it will have a greater effect. See notes 143 and 145 infra.
138. See, e.g., Center-City Properties Prospectus (Jan. 19, 1962). In this syndication
a first mortgage in the amount of $270,000 was obtained. It matured in 10 years with
approximately $198,666 remaining after maturity. Id. at 12. By having a balloon,
amortization is kept low. At the expiration of the term of the mortgage the balloon
will be refinanced, thus amortizing the principal over a greater period.
139. See note 125 supra.
140. See note 135 supra.
141. See note 134 supra.
142. E.g., assume the income of the organization is $100,000 and there is an allowance
for depreciation of $10,000 while amortization is $5,000 and interest is $2,000.
Taxable Income Cash Available for Distribution
Net Rent Received $100,000 Net Rent Received $100,000
Less: Less:
Depreciation Interest $2,000
Allowance $10,000 Amortization 5,000 7,000
Interest 2,000 12,000 Cash Distributed $ 93,000
Taxable Income $ 88,000
Thus, there would be a distribution of $93,000 and a taxable income of $88,000 resulting
in a tax free income of $5,000 (depreciation minus amortization).
duced.14 3 If, on the other hand, amortization exceeds depreciation, the difference
will result in a situation whereby a tax is paid on income never actually
received.'4
Since the basic purpose of syndication is to achieve tax benefits, the
organization will ordinarily arrange to receive a tax-free income, which
decreases yearly145 to a point where the factors of depreciation and amortiza-
tion are equal. At this point the syndicate must contemplate either refinancing
the mortgage'4 0 or an outright sale of the property.1 7 Thus, it is apparent
that despite the permanent nature of the investment,145  unfavorable tax
consequences might dictate a premature disposition.149
143. See note 127 supra.
144. E.g., assume the income for the organization is $100,C00 and interet expnse is
$2,000; depredation is $5,000 and amortization is $10,000.
Cash Available for
Taxable Income Distribution
Gross Income $1C0,000 Gross Income 1icn
Less: Less:
Depredation Interest
Allowance $5,000 Epense $ 2,(CC
Interest Expense 2,00O 7,000 Amortization 10,C 12,Cza
Taxable Income $ 93,000 Distributcd $ Sc0
The participants would receive $SS,000 and be taxed on $93,00, thus paying tax on $5,00
which was never received.
145.
Anticipated Portion Tax
Annual Reportable as Free Percntage of Tax
Distribution Ordinary Income Income Free Income
Ist Yr. $500 $167.2S $332.72 665
2d Yr. 500 212.00 25S.00 57%'o
3d Yr. 500 255.65 244.35 4%'
4th Yr. 500 293.36 201.64 40%
5th Yr. 500 34024 159.66 32%
This is the anticipated distributions of Center-City Properties for each Q500 unit. See
Center-City Properties Prospectus, p. 14 (Jan. 19, 1962).
146. Id. at 13.
147. Ibid.
143. See Silverman, Modem Techniques of Acquiring and Owning Property: The
Real Estate Syndicate, N.Y.U. 18th Inst. on Fed. Tax 1, 4 (1960).
149. The syndicate will sometimes anticipate refinancing at a future date, but ths will
be contingent upon economic conditions which cannot be predicted. See Center-City
Properties Prospectus, p. 13 (Jan. 19, 1962).
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IV. REGULATION OF THE SYNDICATE
A. Federal Regulation
1. Generally
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 193310 makes it unlawful to use in-
terstate transportation or communication facilities or the mails to sell
securities through the use of any prospectus1"' unless the latter is reg-
istered.152 The section also prohibits the use of any means of interstate
commerce to carry or transmit any prospectus unless it meets the requirements
of section 10 of the act.' 53 The Government by this act is not attempting
to approve or disapprove of an offering or security but is merely requiring
registration under the terms of the act. 54 In effect, anyone offering securities
on an interstate basis'5 5 comes under the act and is thus required to register.
It is clear, from the definition of a security, 5" that a real estate syndicate
is subject to the act. 57 If the syndicate employed the corporate form,
participation would be in the form of stocks and bonds and would be
covered expressly by the act. 5 8 Likewise trust certificates are deemed secu-
rities, 59 and the statutory definition is broad enough to include partnership
interests.'0 0
2. Operation of the Statute
The theory of the act is full disclosure and anti-fraud. It provides for
a twenty day waiting period before registration becomes effective.' 0 ' During
150. 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1958) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
151. 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958).
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid.
154. 48 Stat. 87 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77w (1958).
155. See 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e (1958). See also 1 Loss,
Securities Regulation 207 (1961).
156. "The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence
of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or participation
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to sub-
scribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(1) (1958).
157. See Kroll, Syndication and Regulation, 14 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 71, 73 (1959).
158. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1958).
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid; see Berger, Real Estate Syndication: Property, Promotion, and the Need for
Protection, 69 Yale L.J. 725, 760-62 (1960); Kroll, Syndication and Regulation, 14 Record
of N.Y.C.B.A. 71, 73 (1959). In SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), an invest-
ment contract was defined as a "transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money
in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or
a third party . . . ." Id. at 298-99.
161. 48 Stat. 79 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1958).
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this period the Commission studies and determines the adequacy of the infor-
mation contained in the prospectus.1 2 Offers may be extended during this
time provided they comply with section 10.103
Legal, 1' equitable, 0 5 and criminal sanctions c3 attach to violations of the
act. Thus, where false statements are contained in a prospectus or where
registration requirements are not met, the syndicate incurs civil liability to
the investors. In addition, the Commission is empowered to petition for an
injunction against further violations and at the same time transmit evidence
to the Attorney General for criminal prosecution. 107
3. Exemptions
The fact that a syndicate comes under the provisions of the act does not
automatically require registration. 0 9 Express exemptions from this require-
ment are provided for. It does not follow, however, that a syndicate is thereby
relieved from the civi6 and criminal provisions of the act.'"0
Section 3(a)(11) exempts any securities issue offered and sold only to
persons within a single state, where the issuer is resident and doing business.' 7'
This, of course, contemplates a transaction originated and consummated
within the boundaries of one state by residents of that state.'- 2 Thus, if
offered or sold to one nonresident, the entire issue will be excluded from this
exemption.173
Involved in determining the exemption is the meaning of the term "issue."174
The regulations require the Commission, in determining the time of issuance,
to look to the ultimate purchaser, and to ignore the fact that the immediate
162. Ibid.
163. 43 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (195S). Sze aL-o Coben,
Federal Legislation Affecting the Public Offering of Securities, 23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 119,
132-33 (1959).
164. 4S Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1953).
165. 4S Stat. 86 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1953).
166. 43 Stat. S7 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1953).
167. 4S Stat. 86 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1958).
163. 43 Stat. 75-77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77d (1953).
169. 4S Stat. S4 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1953).
170. 48 Stat. S4 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1953).
171. 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1953).
172. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434, Dec. 6, 1961.
173. Even if an actual sale does not take place, an offer to an nonresident detroys the
exemption for the entire issue. SEC v. Truckee Showboat Inc., 157 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.
Cal. 1957).
174. A basic condition of the exemption is that the entire isue be offered and sold
exclusively to the residents of one state. Whether an offering is an integrated part of an
offering previously made or about to be made is a question of fact. Any one or more of
the following factors may be determinative of the question of inteZration: (1) are the
offerings part of a single plan of financing; (2) do the offerings involve iszuance of the
same class of security; (3) are the offerings made on or about the same time; (4) is the
same type of consideration to be received; and, (5) are the offerings made for the same
general purpose. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434, Dec. 6, 1961.
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sale might have been to a dealer for the purpose of resale.170 Moreover, to
preserve the exemption it is incumbent upon the dealer to obtain assurances
from his immediate buyer that the participation is not being purchased with
a view toward resale to a nonresident.170 This, of course, does not preclude
the purchaser from reselling in due course177 to a nonresident. It should be
noted that use of the mails does not, of itself, defeat the exemption. 17 8
The act provides for an additional exemption from its provisions where
the offering is private.'7 9 Such an exemption will not, however, relieve the
issuer from civil liability for false statements. 80 In determining the nature
of an offering several factors are taken into account.181 Among these are:
(1) the number of offerees and their relation to the issuer and to each
other; (2) the number of units offered; (3) the size of the offering; (4)
the manner of the offering. 182
A final though qualified exemption applicable to syndicates is provided
for in the case of an issue involving less than $300,000. Here, however, the
Commission's consent is necessary. 83
B. New York State Regulation
In addition to federal statutes, syndicates organized in New York must
consider New York laws regarding offerings of securities. 18'1 Unlike the general
treatment provided in the federal statutes, New York deals specifically with
the real estate syndicate. 8 5 A special section 80 established in the Bureau
of Securities within the Department of Law is responsible for the enforcement
of the act187
Section 352 of the General Business Law prohibits a public offering of
the securities of a real estate venture, either in or from New York, until
the attorney general issues a letter confirming registration of the offering
statement or prospectus. 88 The act does not however, give the attorney
general the power to approve or disapprove an offering, 8 9 but merely places
the burden of full disclosure upon the issuer. One who is not primarily
175. Ibid.
176. Ibid.
177. Ibid.
178. Ibid.
179. 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1958) ; see Dclaney, The Whys
and Wherefores of Investment Letters, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 267 (1961).
180. Moore v. Gorman, 75 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
181. Op. Gen. Counsel, SEC Securities Act Release No. 285, Jan. 24, 1935.
182. Ibid. See also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), where the Court
rejected the test of the number of offerees.
183. 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1958).
184. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352e-52j.
185. See N.Y. Attorney Gen. Reg. § 1(b) (1961).
186. N.Y. Attorney Gen. Reg. § 1(c) (1961).
187. Ibid.
188. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352e(2).
189. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352e(4).
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engaged in the business of buying and selling buildings, realty, or other
interests therein, is not included within the definition of this act."-' Although
prohibition is placed on public offers, the act does not forbid the circulation
of non-firm offers or a preliminary prospectus which meet the requirements
of Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1933.101
The prospectus used for the general offering must contain all the elements
prescribed in section 352e(1) (b) of the statute, 02 and any additional informa-
tion the attorney general may require to aid individuals in evaluating the
investment.' 3 The cover of the prospectus must contain a statement, in
bold print, to the effect that filing does not amount to approval of the issue by
the attorney general.104 But yet, the statement itself probably induces public
confidence in the issue.'0 5 In addition to the other details, information on
the cover must include the amount of money to be raised, and reference
to the paragraph in the prospectus indicating the net proceeds to the issuer. 00
All advertisements in connection with the offering must be consistent vith the
prospectus, 0 7 and must contain the following inscription:
This advertisement is not an offering. No offering is made except by a prospectus
filed with the Department of Law of the State of New York. Such filing does not
constitute approval of the issue or the sale thereof by the Department of Law or the
Attorney General of the State of New York.'0 5
No offering or sale may be made except on the basis of the prospectus, and
the expected purchaser must be given a true copy of it.100 In addition to
the original filing, annual certified financial statements must be sent to the
attorney general.2 00
The statute provides for two exemptions from its provisions: (1) where
the offering is made to persons not exceeding forty in number,- '- and,
(2) where the offering has been fully registered with the Securities Exchange
Commission or has received an exemption therefrom for reasons other than
that it is an intrastate issue.2
02
190. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352e(I) (a).
191. Ibid. Section 10(b) permits the use of a summary prdpcctus. See 43 Stat. 31 (1933),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (195S).
192. Among other things, it must include the profits and interest of the promoter. N.Y.
Gen. Bus. Law § 352e(1) (b).
193. Ibid. See also N.Y. Attorney Gen. Reg. § 2 (1961).
194. N.Y. Attorney Gen. Reg. § 2(a) (1) (1961).
195. See 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 135 (1961).
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199. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352e(5).
200. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352e(S). In addition, where the venture is abandoned, form
RS 3 must be filed, giving an explanation for the failure and the disposition of the funds
raised, N.Y. Attorney Gen. Reg. § 1(h) (1961), because any funds raked are held in trust
for the participants until the consummation of the transaction. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 35h.
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The Real Estate Syndicate Act is part of the comprehensive Martin Act 203
which makes it a misdemeanor to engage in fraudulent practices or deceptive
acts with respect to securities.2 0 4 Under the Martin Act the attorney general
has power to investigate and to subpoena witnesses and records,20 and to
enjoin acts which violate or are about to violate the provisions of the statute.200
V. REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST ACT
The trust form of syndication has been traditionally avoided because of
the danger of corporate tax treatment.20 7 Recent revenue legislation,208
however, offers an inducement for syndicators to adopt this form. Compliance
with the Real Estate Investment Trust Act results in the creation of a non-
taxable entity.2 0 9 In effect, it renders the trust a conduit whereby the corporate
tax is eliminated to the extent income is distributed.2 1 0 The act was added to
the code to provide substantially the same tax treatment as is enjoyed by regu-
lated trust companies. 21'
Various opinions have been offered concerning the effect of the act on the
more traditional forms of syndication. Divergent state trust laws combine
with intricacies of the act to block a whole-hearted approval of its provisions.
Whether or not the trust will experience new interest as an investment form
depends upon the success or failure of real estate groups organized under its
provisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether or not the syndicate survives as a major form of real estate
investment, its method will sustain the goals for which it was created. As
long as the federal government continues its soft approach toward entity taxa-
tion, the financial feasibility of group real estate ventures is assured. As a result,
both the "little fellow" and the "big fellow" are afforded a degree of equality
in seeking good investment opportunities.
Individual investors, also, have prospered; federal and state regulation
of the syndicate insures full disclosure to the investor. Caution is still required
of the individual or institution however, for like all investments, real estate
is subject to the changing economic scene.
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